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THE USE OF NATIONAL AND COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITIONS IN ITALIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
AND HIGH-LEVEL COURTS 
 




The article analyses how the Italian legal scholarship and 
highest courts have construed the Italian constitutional tradition 
and the notion of common constitutional traditions. It starts with a 
brief overview of the notion of “legal tradition” in comparative 
legal scholarship, and then considers the differences between the 
latter and other neighbouring, but different, concepts. After that, 
the work gives an account of the authors who have provided the 
most valuable contributions in the field, and then surveys how the 
high courts have made use of the expression of (common) 
constitutional traditions. The conclusion suggests a categorization 
of such uses**. 
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«Comparison is thus a process of peaceful coexistence of those who are taken 
as equals, in spite of even major difference in belief, circumstance or tradition» 
P.H. Glenn, The National Legal Tradition, 
in General Reports of the XVIIth Congress of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law, edited by K. Boele-Woelki and S. Van Erp,  
Brussels, Bruylant, 2007, 15 
 
 
1. The framework: the relevance of the notion of “legal 
tradition” in the comparative legal literature and the purposes 
and methodology of the analysis 
«Comparative law, understood as a science, necessarily 
aims at the better understanding of legal data. Ulterior tasks such 
as the improvement of law or interpretation are worthy of the 
greatest consideration but nevertheless are only secondary ends of 
comparative research»1. I would like to begin this brief inquiry 
into the substance of the Italian constitutional tradition from this 
observation on the benefits of a comparative perspective. 
Comparative law – affirmed the prominent Italian legal scholars 
who convened in Trento in 1987 – is a scientific effort per se, 
because of its contribution to the advancement of knowledge. 
Moreover, comparative law can also serve a specific 
purpose. As Ajani, Pasa and Francavilla explain, facilitating the 
task of legal interpretation is among these aims: an example in 
point is «the use, by the European legal interpreter, […] of the 
“constitutional traditions common to the Member States” [art. 6 TEU, 
that incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union of 2000, by equating it to the Treaties] in order to 
distil the rule to apply to a particular case»2. And this is precisely 
the purpose that this work will try to serve. 
To be sure, the background of comparative legal 
scholarship is even more relevant to the study of common 
                                               
1 First Trento thesis, as cited by R. Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach To 
Comparative Law, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1991), 4-5, footnote 6. 
2 G. Ajani, B. Pasa, D. Francavilla, Diritto comparato. Lezioni e materiali (2018), 6 
(the translation is mine). The Authors also refer to B. Markesinis, J. Fedtke, 
Judicial recourse to foreign law: a new source of inspiration? (2006), 9 ff. of the Italian 
translation, Giudici e diritto straniero. La pratica del diritto comparato (2009). 
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constitutional traditions (from now on also referred to as CCTs), 
because of the in-depth studies it performed on the very notion of 
legal tradition3. Merryman was the first author to offer a definition 
of this expression, in the following terms: «A legal tradition, as the 
term implies, is not a set of rules of law about contracts, 
corporations, and crimes, although such rules will almost always 
be in some sense a reflection of that tradition. Rather it is a set of 
deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature 
of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about 
the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and 
about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, 
perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the legal system 
to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal 
system into cultural perspective»4. 
Krygier was another prominent scholar who investigated 
the notion of tradition in relation to law: «Like all complex 
traditions, law records and preserves a composite of (frequently 
inconsistent) beliefs, opinions, values, decisions, myths, rituals, 
deposited over generations. […] Traditions, particularly recorded 
traditions, provide us with store-houses of possibly relevant 
analogies to our present problems, and successful and 
unsuccessful attempts to solve them […]. The relevance of this to 
law is obvious. Law deals with myriad practical problems which 
individuals who use it have not, indeed could not, alone foresee or 
forestall»5. 
This Author made a substantial contribution to the 
understanding of the dynamic nature of constitutional traditions, 
that he showed were not in opposition to the notion of ‘change’. 
As Sadurski captured very well, Krygier «helpfully suggested 
[that] we use the language of a (legal) tradition when we attempt 
to describe how legal past is relevant to the legal present. It is 
about the power of the past-in-the-present»6. 
                                               
3 See broadly G. Ajani, B. Pasa, D. Francavilla, Diritto comparato, cit. at 2, 16-17. 
4 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Western Europe and Latin America (1969), 2. 
5 M. Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 Law & Phil. 237 (1986), 241 ff. 
6 W. Sadurski, European Constitutional Identity?, EUI Working Papers LAW No. 
2006/33, available at 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6391/LAW-2006-33.pdf, 4. The 
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In the following pages, after providing some necessary 
clarifications on how the notion of constitutional tradition differs 
from others that typically come up in this domain (par. 2), I will 
present the result of an analysis of how the Italian literature and 
case-law have contributed to defining the national constitutional 
tradition, which – together with the other national constitutional 
traditions – is to be intended as a building block of common 
constitutional traditions (Art. 6 TEU). 
To be sure, a fully-fledged treatment of the challenging task 
to define the Italian constitutional tradition in all its main 
components still appears to be lacking, and it is beyond the 
purposes of this work to present a comprehensive picture 7 . 
However, an attempt will be made to contribute to the reflection 
in the field in an indirect way, i.e. by looking at how the notion of 
common constitutional traditions has been understood and used by 
the Italian constitutional scholarship and case-law: this effort is 
                                                                                                                   
quotation proceeds in the following way: « Krygier goes on by identifying three 
indicia of such past-in-the-present. First, a subject of tradition is drawn from a 
real or imagined past […]. Second, the hold of the past over the present is 
authoritative: it is not a mere description of what elements of the past are 
incrusted into our modern world but in a presence-talk the past is treated as 
significant. It has a normative force. […] Third, there is a factor of transmission 
of the past into the present: the past is not dug out from the profound layers of 
history but passed on to us from an immediate predecessor era; hence, there is a 
real or imagined continuity between past and present». On top of Krygier’s 
article mentioned above in the previous footnote, Sadurski refers to the 
following works of his: Traditionality of Statutes, 1 Ratio Juris 20 (1988); Tipologia 
della tradizione, 5 Intersezioni: Riv. storia id. 221 (1985); Thinking Like a Lawyer, in 
W. Sadurski (ed.), Ethical Dimensions of Legal Theory (1991), 67 ff.. See also, 
Tradition, in A.-J. Arnaud (ed.), Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de 
sociologie du droit (1988), 423 ff.; Legal Traditions and Their Virtue, in G. Skąpska, 
K. Pałecki (eds.), Prawo w Zmieniającym Się Społeczeństwie (1992), 243 ff.; cf. as 
well the following writings with A. Czarnota are worth mentioning: Revolutions 
and the Continuity of European Law, in Z. Bańkowski (ed.), Revolutions in Law and 
Legal Thought (1991), 90 ff.; From State to Legal Traditions? Prospects for the Law 
After Communism, in J. Frentzel-Zagórska (ed.), A One-Party State to Democracy: 
Transition in Eastern Europe (1993), 91 ff.. Finally, much more recently, see Too 
Much Information, in H. Dedek (ed.) Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence. Essays in Memory 
of H. Patrick Glenn (forthcoming 2020). 
7 I would anyway like to refer to my reflections on what I submit to be the 
quintessential feature of the Italian constitutional traditions, i.e. the “social 
principle”, currently being peer-reviewed by the law review Federalismi.it. 
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meant to be read in the context of a broader research project, the 
one of the European Law Institute on common constitutional 
traditions 8 . The methodological assumption is that common 
constitutional traditions are best identified once national 
constitutional traditions have been carefully described9. 
I will therefore briefly review the most relevant national 
legal scholarship in the field (par. 3), and then move on to the 
judicial formant, considering how frequently Italian high-level 
courts use the notion of constitutional tradition (and some other 
closely connected notions) (par. 4). In the final paragraph, I will 
offer my conclusive remarks, by proposing a possible classification 
of the different uses of this notion by top Italian courts (par. 5). 
 
 
2. The need to trace boundaries with other concurring (but 
different) notions 
First of all, before proceeding with the actual analysis, a 
linguistic caveat is in order: the aforementioned Art. 6 TEU refers 
to the word “traditions” (“tradizioni”, in the Italian version). It 
would go beyond the scope of this work to investigate the 
implications of such a choice. For the purposes of this article, the 
term (national) constitutional tradition can be taken as 
encompassing the fundamental features of a certain constitutional 
order. From a slightly different perspective, a tradition is a set of 
principles, so it can arguably be used to encompass the word 
“principles”10. In the text, the word ‘principle’ will therefore be 
employed as a subset of the word ‘tradition’: from this 
perspective, a series of particularly relevant principles make up a 
tradition. In the Italian case, such principles can arguably be 
grouped under the label “social principle”, which will be the 
                                               
8 The article mentioned in the previous footnote is part of the same inquiry and 
should be read in close connection to the present one. 
9 Cf. Glenn, Doin’ the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions, 50 McGill 
L.J. 863 (2005): «By examining the traditions that form the foundations of 
particular legal systems, it is possible to gain a fuller understanding of the 
interrelationship of the laws of the world and to move beyond the theoretical 
constraints of traditional legal positivism» (abstract at p. 863). 
10 A recent study of the latter is the one by N.W. Barber, The Principles of 
Constitutionalism (2018). 
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underlying theme of this analysis. In summary, when the article 
mentions principles, it takes them as strands of the genus 
‘tradition’. 
However, reference will inevitably be made to another key 
word: “identity”. In fact, what I am interested in is trying to set 
out the features that make the Italian constitutional tradition stand 
out in relation to the constitutional traditions of the other EU 
Member States. In other words, the present analysis attempts to 
capture a few distinctive features that are typical of the Italian 
tradition to such an extent that they define the country’s 
constitutional identity 11 . This work is then intended to be 
compared with similar national reports on other EU Member 
States, in order to comparatively assess the distinctive features of 
the respective ‘iura propria’, and use this groundwork to help 
define, by contrast, what is “really” common among the various 
national constitutional traditions12. Hopefully, this type of analysis 
might be of some use to the courts, especially European ones, 
which have so far have shied away from in-depth considerations 
                                               
11 From this perspective, the present article lays out the basis for the further 
research performed by my closely connected article already mentioned in 
footnotes 7 and 8, which carries out the task described in the text in even 
greater detail. On the relationship between tradition and identity, P. Glenn, 
Legal Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law (2000), 30 ff.. By this 
Author, see also A Concept of Legal Tradition, 34 QLJ 427 (2008), on top of the 
works cited in the epigraph at the beginning of the article, and above in 
footnote 9. More broadly, some fundamental works on the subject include M. 
Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject. Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, 
and Community, (2009); G.J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (2010); E. Cloots, 
National Identity in EU Law (2015) (cf. especially the first part); C. Calliess, G. 
van der Schyff (eds.), Constitutional Identity in a Europe of Multilevel 
Constitutionalism (2019). See also T. Drinóczi, Constitutional Identity in Europe: 
The Identity of the Constitution. A Regional Approach, 21 Germ. L.J. 105 (2020). 
12 In this regard, B. Markesinis, J. Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: a new 
source of inspiration?, cit. at 2, 119-20: «the formula so frequently found in ECJ 
judgments – that the Court ‘draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States’ – is in fact often a code for comparative work 
previously conducted by the Advocate Generals. Moulded into a corpus of 
Community law by the ECJ, the lines between national ideas thereby eventually 
fade and, over time, disappear». Again, the comparative effort described in the 
text is envisioned within the framework of the mentioned ELI project. 
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when asserting the existence of a common constitutional 
tradition13. 
Inevitably, as well, the question arises of the intersection 
between the outcome of this inquiry and the notion of ‘counter-
limits’ (‘controlimiti’)14, on the one hand, and the connected study 
on non-amendable parts of the constitution15. There is indeed a 
partial overlap between what makes up the national constitutional 
identity and the fundamental choices of a constitutional order that 
cannot be reversed, or even questioned, either by superior legal 
orders such as the EU legal system, or by way of national 
constitutional amendment16. 
However, major differences exist: by definition, the notion 
of counter-limits is a tool to that can be made use of only in 
borderline cases, to defuse a potential conflict between the 
national constitutional order and that of the EU. They may never 
actually be employed, only “threatened” (as, most recently, in the 
case of the well-known Taricco saga), and only in residual, highly 
controversial and highly sensitive situations. A national 
constitutional identity, instead, is a more general notion: it almost 
certainly encompasses everything that could be activated as a 
counter-limit, but is definitely not restricted to this last-resort 
notion. 
Similarly, the unamendable parts of the constitution of a 
country are typically a component of its constitutional identity, or 
                                               
13 R. de Caria, M. Graziadei, The «Constitutional Traditions Common to the Member 
States» in the Case-law of the European Court of Justice: Judicial Dialogue at its Finest, 
67 Riv. Trim. Dir. Pub. 949 (2017). 
14  Among many contributions of the Italian scholarship in English on the 
subject, see one of the most recent, D. Paris, Limiting the ‘counter limits’. National 
constitutional courts and the scope of the primacy of EU law, 10 It. J. Pub. Law 205 
(2018). This doctrine was introduced by the Italian and German constitutional 
courts, respectively with judgments Frontini (18 December 1973, No. 183) and 
Solange I (29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974]), as a response to ECJ’s judgment 
in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ruling where the European Court 
introduced the notion of CCTs; see also B. Markesinis, J. Fedtke, Judicial Recourse 
to Foreign Law: a new source of inspiration?, cit. at 2, 117. 
15 On this topic, broadly Y. Roznai, Unconstitutional constitutional amendments. 
The Limits of Amendment Powers (2017). 
16 For some enlightening reflections on these issues, M. Cartabia, La Costituzione 
italiana e l’universalità dei diritti umani, in Astrid (2008), available at www.astrid-
online.it. 
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tradition, but this latter notion is arguably broader17: a tradition is 
a lasting feature that is destined to remain unchanged even 
though it is not declared unchangeable, at least until or unless a 
complete paradigm shift takes place, bringing up a Grundnorm18 
change. In other words, unamendable parts of a constitution, in 
spite of their name, appear less immutable than the inner, often 
unwritten underpinnings of a legal system that make up its 
tradition (and define its identity). I would therefore argue that 
what it takes to amend an unamendable part of a constitution, is 
merely the political will and consensus to bring about such 
change19. 
Admittedly, a distinguished line of thinking on 
constitutional scholarship argues that fundamental principles also 
constrain a new constituent power20, and in the same vein the 
literature in the field of international law usually affirms the 
existence of some international constitutional limitations for the 
adoption of a new constitution, such as its cornerstones (which it 
is the job of international organisations offering constitutional 
advice to identify, the Venice Commission above all)21. However, 
one could be more cynical and acknowledge that, should the 
popular will be strong enough to bring about an unconstitutional 
constitutional change, such a change would be effective, no matter 
how fundamental the principle was in the previous legal order. 
On the contrary, a tradition does not simply change by an act of 
political will, not even a very popular one22: a tradition has its 
                                               
17 Broadly on this subject M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea 
(1995), 26 ff., where the Author deals with the role of CCTs in the shaping of 
general principles of EU law. 
18 The obvious reference is to H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1960, 1934). 
19 C. Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1922). 
20 Among many, M. Dogliani, Potere costituente e revisione costituzionale, 15 Quad. 
cost. 7 (1995). 
21 In this regard M. De Visser, A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice 
Commission in Processes of Domestic Constitutional Reform, 63 Am. J. Comp. L. 963 
(2015). 
22 Let me just refer here to the touchstone by S. Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico. 
Studi sul concetto, le fonti e i caratteri del diritto (1918), recently translated into 
English by M. Croce (The legal order, 2017): Santi Romano writes, for instance: «it 
is, in the first place, the complex and multi-faceted organization of the Italian 
and French states, the numerous mechanisms and gears, the links between 
authorities and forces, that produce, modify, enforce, guarantee legal norms, 
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roots in different pre-constitutional moments, or anyway in 
constitutional moments that precede the Constitution that 
happens to be in force at any given moment23. 
 
 
3. An overview of the relevant national literature 
I believe it is necessary to begin my analysis with a brief 
inquiry into the scholarship that has investigated this subject. 
First of all, it should be noted that most of the relevant 
Italian literature appears to be focused mainly on the 
constitutional traditions common to the EU, rather than on 
explicitly trying to define the Italian constitutional tradition per se, 
a line of research that has been comparatively less investigated. 
After a number of seminal works by Alessandro 
Pizzorusso, who raised some important points regarding what he 
defined as «the dialectic between the national and supranational 
principles» 24 , and by Luigi Lacchè, who envisioned that the 
principles derived from constitutions and from common 
constitutional traditions might lead to the processing of a “new 
common right” that took into account the past and the history of 
single member States and, at the same time, looked to the future25, 
the Italian literature on CCTs has grown extensively, welcoming 
contributions from a number of prominent scholars, and is in fact 
too broad to be effectively summarized here26. 
                                                                                                                   
but cannot be identified with them» (p. 7 of the English translation). The legal 
tradition has arguably much to do with the notion of legal order in Santi 
Romano’s sense. 
23  From this perspective, some connections also appear to exist with the 
‘conventions’, that are deemed to be a crucial unwritten component of the UK 
constitution: see, among many, G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (1980). 
24 A. Pizzorusso, Common constitutional traditions as Constitutional Law of Europe?, 
Sant’Anna Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1/2008, available at 
www.stals.sssup.it, and Id., Il patrimonio costituzionale europeo (2002); it is also 
worth recalling the two seminal volumes edited by the same Author, Italian 
Studies in Law (1992 and 1994). 
25  L. Lacchè, Europa una et diversa. A proposito di ius commune europaeum e 
tradizioni costituzionali comuni, Forum Historiae Iuris (2003), available 
at forhistiur.de. 
26 F. Belvisi, The “Common Constitutional Traditions” and the Integration of the EU, 
6 Dir. & quest. pub. 21 (2006); Id., Fundamental Rights in the Multicultural 
European Society, in B. Henry, A. Loreton (eds.), The Emerging European Union: 
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Among the authors who have written most extensively on 
the subject in recent years, Oreste Pollicino and Marta Cartabia are 
certainly among them. As for the former, on top of substantially 
contributing to the ongoing revitalization of studies on the subject 
(insightfully characterizing the discourse regarding their death as 
a premature chronicle27), he carefully reflected on the intersection 
                                                                                                                   
Identity, Citizenship, Rights (2004), 177 ff.; P. Carrozza, Tradizioni costituzionali 
comuni, margine di apprezzamento e rapporti tra Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità 
europee e Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Quale Europa dei Diritti?, in P. Falzea, 
A. Spadaro, L. Ventura (eds.), La Corte costituzionale e le Corti d’Europa (2003), 
567 ff.; M. Cartabia, L’ora dei diritti fondamentali nell’Unione europea, in Ead. (ed.) I 
diritti in azione (2007), 13 ff.; L. Cozzolino, Le tradizioni costituzionali comuni nella 
giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee, in P. Falzea, A. 
Spadaro, L. Ventura (eds.), La Corte costituzionale e le Corti d’Europa, cit. just 
above, 3 ff.; G. De Vergottini, Tradizioni costituzionali comuni e Costituzione 
europea, in www.forumcostituzionale.it (2005); S. Gambino, Identità costituzionali 
nazionali e primauté eurounitaria, 32 Quad. cost. 533 (2012); A. Guazzarotti, Il 
paradosso della ricognizione delle consuetudini internazionali. Note minime a Corte 
cost. n. 238 del 2014, in www.forumcostituzionale.it (2014); G. Marini, La 
costruzione delle tradizioni giuridiche nell’epoca della globalizzazione, 1 Compar. Dir. 
Civ. 31 (2010); G. Martinico, B. Guastaferro, O. Pollicino, The Constitution of Italy: 
Axiological Continuity Between the Domestic and International Levels of Governance?, 
in A. Albi, S. Bardutzky (eds.), National Constitutions in European and Global 
Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (2019), 493 ff.; S. Ninatti, Ieri e oggi 
delle tradizioni costituzionali comuni: le novità nella giurisprudenza comunitaria, in G. 
D’Elia, G. Tiberi, M.P. Viviani Schlein (eds.), Scritti in memoria di Alessandra 
Concaro (2012), 533 ff.; C. Pinelli, Il momento della scrittura: contributo al dibattito 
sulla Costituzione europea (2002); Id., The Formation of a Constitutional Tradition in 
Continental Europe since World War II, 22 Eur. Pub. Law 257 (2016); G. Repetto, 
Argomenti comparativi e diritti fondamentali in Europa. Teorie dell’interpretazione e 
giurisprudenza sovranazionale (2011); P. Ridola, La Carta dei diritti fondamentali 
dell’Unione Europea e le “tradizioni costituzionali comuni” degli stati membri, in Id. 
(ed.), Diritto comparato e diritto costituzionale europeo (2010), 163 ss; A. Ruggeri, 
“Tradizioni costituzionali comuni” e “controlimiti”, tra teoria delle fonti e teoria 
dell’interpretazione, 5 DPCE 102 (2003); A. Ruggeri, Trattato costituzionale, 
europeizzazione dei “controlimiti” e tecniche di risoluzione delle antinomie tra diritto 
comunitario e diritto interno (profili problematici), in S. Staiano (ed.), Giurisprudenza 
costituzionale e principi fondamentali (2006), 827 ff.; V. Sciarabba, Tra fonti e corti. 
Diritti e principi fondamentali in Europa: profili costituzionali e comparati degli 
sviluppi sovranazionali (2008); L. Trucco, Carta dei diritti fondamentali e 
costituzionalizzazione dell’Unione europea. Un’analisi delle strategie argomentative e 
delle tecniche decisorie a Lussemburgo (2013). 
27 O. Pollicino, Common constitutional traditions in the age of the European bill(s) of 
rights: Chronicle of a (somewhat prematurely) death foretold, in L. Violini, A. 
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between the notion of CCTs and the one of constitutional identity: 
«the concept of common constitutional traditions crosses the 
notion of constitutional identity»28 and this intersection cannot be 
simply considered as a clash of common traditions against a 
specific national tradition29. As for Cartabia, the notion of CCTs 
surfaces and underlies many of her writings30, and has been a 
recurring theme also in her judgeship at the Italian Constitutional 
court, of which she became President in the final year of her 
tenure. 
In summary, such authors are undoubtedly among those 
who should be most credited for reviving this concept in Italian 
public law scholarship, which until now has perhaps not 
attributed much relevance to it: there appears to be no trace of 
extensive works on the notion of constitutional tradition before its 
use by the ECJ in 1970, and its potential has never been fully 
exploited up until now.. Instead, the initiative of authors such as 
Cartabia and Pollicino appears to have paved the way for 
facilitating the fullest deployment of this concept and its potential 
within the national constitutional framework as well as within 
                                                                                                                   
Baraggia (eds.), The Fragmented Landscape of Fundamental Rights Protection in 
Europe (2018), 42 ff.. 
28 O. Pollicino, Corte di giustizia e giudici nazionali: il moto “ascendente”, ovverosia 
l’incidenza delle “tradizioni costituzionali comuni” nella tutela apprestata ai diritti 
dalla Corte dell’Unione, Consulta Online (2015, No. 1), 244, available at 
www.giurcost.org (the translation is mine). 
29 Besides the writings mentioned in the previous footnotes, see M. Bassini, O. 
Pollicino, Article 8, in R. Mastroianni, O. Pollicino, O. Razzolini, S. Allegrezza 
and F. Pappalardo (eds.), Commentary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (in Italian) (2016), 134 ff.; O. Pollicino, Presentazione. Costruendo le 
tradizioni dei diritti in Europa: il senso di un gerundio, e di un seminario, 7 La 
cittadin. Eur., fasc. supp. Costruendo le tradizioni dei diritti in Europa (2016), 5 ff.; 
Id., Della sopravvivenza delle tradizioni costituzionali comuni alla Carta di Nizza: 
ovvero del mancato avverarsi di una (cronaca di una) morte annunciata, 21 Dir. Un. 
Eur. 253 (2016); Id., Las tradiciones constitucionales comunes en la edad de la 
codificación (europea) de los derechos, in C. Pizzolo, L. Mezzetti (eds.), Tribunales 
supranacionales y tribunales nacionales, II (2016), 183 ff.; Id., “Transfiguration” and 
Actual Relevance of the Common Constitutional Traditions: Past, Present and Future, 
18 Global Jurist (2018); M. Fichera, O. Pollicino, The Dialectics Between 
Constitutional Identity and Common Constitutional Traditions: Which Language for 
Cooperative Constitutionalism in Europe?, 20 Ger. L. J. 1097 (2019). 
30 See in particular, among many, the ones referenced supra in footnotes 16, 17 
and 26. 
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that of the EU. From this decidedly Euro-friendly perspective, 
CCTs are a possible means to connect the two, by framing the 
Italian identity as part of a multi-level set of identities, compatible 
with the EU legal order, to which it contributes, and not in 
contrast with it, as the opposing sovereigntist narrative puts it. 
In parallel, the Italian-led ELI research project on CCTs has 
already seen the involvement of several scholars. Their 
preliminary writings were hosted by the Rivista Trimestrale di 
Diritto Pubblico, in a 2017 issue to which Cassese, Comba, 
Graziadei-de Caria and Porchia31 contributed. 
As observed above, the Italian literature on the subject has 
perhaps been keener to define and identify the CCTs, and to look 
at them from the European perspective, instead of defining the 
fundamental components of the Italian constitutional tradition. 
However, some interesting debates have taken place in this 
direction, especially with regard to the so-called economic 
constitution, a typically controversial topic. For instance, some 
divergence exists among different authors on whether the 
balanced budget rule is the expression of a constitutional tradition 
or not32. 
                                               
31 Issue 4 of 2017. Cassese was also the leading mind behind the ELI project 
mentioned in the text, in which Cartabia, Comba, della Cananea, Pollicino (as 
well as the Author of this article) were involved. Within the framework of this 
project, Cassese prepared two very important articles: Ruling from below. 
Common Constitutional Traditions and their role, and Toward the end of solitude of 
national legal orders?, both currently forthcoming. The ELI project was also 
brought forward in connection with the ERC-awarded project on the Common 
Core of European Administrative Law, led by Giacinto della Cananea (by this 
Author, an in the framework of this project, see also Il nucleo comune dei diritti 
amministrativi in Europa (2019)). 
32  For the former thesis, O. Chessa, Fondamenti e implicazioni della norma 
costituzionale sul pareggio di bilancio, in A. Ruggeri (ed.), Scritti in onore di Gaetano 
Silvestri, I (2016), 558 ff., 561; for the latter one, Chessa himself mentions G. 
Della Cananea, Lex Fiscalis Europea, 34 Quad. cost. 7 (2014), and A. Morrone, 
Pareggio di bilancio e stato costituzionale, Riv. AIC (2014, No. 1), 1 ff., in particular 
12. Also by G. Della Cananea, see, among many, Ius Publicum Europaeum: 
Divergent National Traditions or Common Legal Patrimony?, in M. Ruffert (ed.), 
Administrative Law in Europe: Between Common Principles and National Traditions 
(2013), 125 ff., and Le tradizioni costituzionali comuni prese sul serio, 2 Riv. dir. 
comp. 17 (2018, No. 1), where he reflects on the possible «complementarity 
between constitutional traditions».  
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Overall, it does not seem possible to actually identify 
different schools of thought in the field: the different authors have 
all contributed to a better understanding of the notion, from their 
respective standpoints, and their contributions appear 
complementary, rather than antagonistic. Also, it would be 
possible to go back several decades, and identify several “monstres 
sacrés” of Italian legal scholarship who reflected on the 
relationship between Italian legal culture and tradition, and other 
national experiences. For instance, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, in 
his famous Programme opening the new publication Archivio di 
diritto pubblico, observed that «the various national scientific 
schools […] infuse the subjective varieties of the single 
peculiarities of the different populations in the objective unity of 
the subject (an issue that I would define as international scientific 
cooperation)» 33 , thus acknowledging that, while theoretical 
national representations diverged, there was a substantive 
commonality of principles. 
In any case, much has been written by many prominent 
legal scholars but a lot arguably remains to be investigated, 
particularly with regard to the Italian contribution to the 
development of CCTs and to the focalization of the quintessential 
elements of the Italian constitutional tradition; this work 
specifically attempts to provide a small contribution to studies on 
the subject with such a perspective in mind. 
 
 
4. A quantitative analysis 
Moving on to how Italian high-level courts relate to the 
notion of CCTs, I will immediately submit that neither the 
Constitutional Court, nor the Court of Cassation, nor the Council 
of State have dealt with this notion in any depth. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to identify certain bedrocks that, in the case-law of all 
the three high-level courts, make up the building blocks of the 
Italian constitutional tradition. 
Despite its deep reflection on the relationship between 
national law and EU law, which has led it to carefully consider the 
extent to which the Italian constitutional tradition can embrace the 
                                               
33 V.E. Orlando, Programma, 1 Arch. Dir. Pub. 3 (1891). 
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principles of EU law (and to overturn its own initial rulings along 
the way), the Constitutional Court has not developed a proper 
jurisprudence on what it means by common constitutional 
traditions (nor for that matter – at least explicitly – on what makes 
up the Italian constitutional tradition). 
A search into the database of the Constitutional Court34 
returned only the following results: four entries for “tradizione 
costituzionale” (constitutional tradition) 35 , twenty-five for 
“tradizioni costituzionali” (“constitutional traditions”)36; none for 
“tradizioni comuni” (common traditions); one for “tradizione 
comune” (common tradition)37; none for “tradizioni nazionali” 
(national traditions); one for “tradizione nazionale” (national 
tradition)38. 
Even the judgment with perhaps the highest number of 
textual references, ruling No. 80 of 2011 39 , concerning the 
relationship with the European Court of Human Rights, is not 
particularly helpful in determining the content of common (or 
                                               
34  The figures in the text result from a search in the database of the 
Constitutional Court performed in July 2020; in making these queries, I built on 
a previous search performed in May 2018 by Professor Paolo Passaglia, to 
whom I express my deepest gratitude. 
35 Judgment No. 223 of 2012 (only in the “Facts of the case” part); judgment No. 
1 of 2014 (only in the “Facts of the case” part); order No. 24 of 2017 (also 
mentioned in the following footnote); judgment No. 142 of 2018 (only in the 
“Facts of the case” part, quoting from the referring order). 
36 Judgment No. 393 of 2006; order No. 93 of 2007; order No. 266 of 2007; 
judgment No. 348 of 2007 (only in the “Facts of the case” part); judgment No. 
349 of 2007; judgment No. 72 of 2008 (only in the “Facts of the case” part); 
judgment No. 215 of 2008; judgment No. 106 of 2009; judgment No. 80 of 2011; 
order No. 179 of 2011; order No. 215 of 2011; order No. 216 of 2011; judgment 
No. 236 of 2011; order No. 295 of 2011; order No. 306 of 2011; order No. 311 del 
2011; judgment No. 223 of 2012 (only in the “Facts of the case” part); judgment 
No. 230 of 2012 (only in the only in the “Facts of the case” part); judgment No. 
214 of 2013 (only in the “Facts of the case” part); order No. 24 of 2017 (also 
returned in the search referred in the previous footnote); judgment No. 269 of 
2017; judgments No. 20 and 112 of 2019; order No. 117 of 2019 (explicitly citing 
“common constitutional traditions” in the questions referred to the CJEU); 
judgment No. 102 of 2020 (the latter three were written by judge Viganò). 
37 Judgment No. 380 of 1999. 
38 Judgment No. 443 of 1997 (the reference here is to a tradition not concerning 
the law). 
39 Constitutional Court, judgment 11 March 2011, No. 80. 
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national) constitutional traditions. Essentially, this ruling 
reaffirmed the practical difference between the EU legal order, 
and the ECHR system: laws contrary to the latter still normally 
need to be declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court 
and cannot be directly disapplied by the ordinary judges. 
In spite of being cited very often by other judgments in 
relation to common constitutional traditions (together with the 
subsequent judgment No. 210/13, which does not mention 
constitutional traditions), judgment No. 80 of 2011 does not 
provide any relevant indications on how to construe them. This is 
even truer for the other judgments (including two of 2019 that 
have appeared to signal a revival of the notion within the Court40), 
with only minor exceptions41. I would mention the following two: 
judgment No. 380/1999, identifying an Italian remote tradition, 
shared with «countries of ancient and consolidated democracy», 
of not punishing «the offenses contained in the writings presented 
or in the speeches given by the parties or their sponsors in the 
proceedings before the judicial authority»; and judgment No. 
106/2009, identifying an Italian tradition, that is also a common 
constitutional tradition, that prohibits the practice of so-called 
extraordinary renditions, as well as one establishing the relatively 
wide reach for the protection of state secrets42. 
Similar conclusions apply when we consider textual 
references in the other two top courts of the Italian legal order, i.e. 
the Court of Cassation and the Council of State. From the research 
in the database of the former (limited to the years from 2013 to 
2018 43 ), 85 results emerge using the keywords “constitutional 
tradition” or “constitutional traditions”, 79 results using the 
keyword “common constitutional traditions”, 88 results using 
keywords “common traditions” or “common tradition”, and 11 
results (all not relevant) using the keywords “national tradition” 
or “national traditions”. 
                                               
40 Judgment No. 20 of 21 February 2019 and order No. 117 of 10 May 2019 
41 Constitutional Court, judgment 30 September-7 October 1999, No. 380.  
42 Constitutional Court, judgment 3 April 2009, No. 106. 
43 Last performed in November 2018: the database of all the judgments and 
orders of the Court of Cassation is indeed freely accessible only with regard to 
the rulings of the past five years. 
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By cross-checking the different results and eliminating the 
rulings containing several keywords, it emerges that there is a 
total of 105 rulings (81 judgments and 24 orders) that contain the 
chosen keywords, with a slight numerical prevalence of the 
decisions of the criminal sections of the Court of Cassation (58 to 
47). The distribution of rulings over time would appear to indicate 
a reduction in the use of these concepts in the Court’s arguments 
over the years: in 2018, there were 7 decisions, in 2017 only 1, 11 in 
2016, 8 in 2015, 25 in 2014, while there were 53 in 2013 (over half of 
the total). 
As for their content, 83 judgments contain only a generic 
reference to the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, 2 concern the prohibition of discrimination, 5 the principle 
of legality, 45 the principle of the retroactive application of the 
more lenient penalty, and 14 judgments that are not relevant. In 
fact, out of the total 105 rulings, 44 actually contain a reference to 
common constitutional traditions only because of the fact that they 
refer to the judgment of the CJEU in the case El Dridi44, of which 
they often quote entire passages, again concerning the principle of 
the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty. 
From an overall analysis of the rulings examined, it also 
emerges that the Italian Supreme Court never formally examined 
the notion of Italian constitutional traditions, almost always 
dealing with the topic of common constitutional traditions in a 
generic way. Indeed, leaving out the generic references to 
common traditions, the only judgment deserving a particular 
mention is No. 1804/2013 45 , concerning the expropriation of 
private property, which affirms that the legality of the 
expropriation procedure is a necessary precondition of the 
acquisition of the condemned property by the state, «consistently 
with a solid constitutional tradition that originates from art. 29 of 
the Albertine Statute (“[…] when legally ascertained public 
interest requires it, one may be obliged to give up […] property 
wholly or in part, with just compensation and in conformity with 
the law)46, and was sanctioned in the Italian Constitution (Article 
                                               
44 CJEU, Section I, 28 April 2011, in the proceeding C-61/11 PPU, El Dridi. 
45 Court of Cassation, judgment 28 January 2013, No. 1804. 
46 This translation was taken from users.dickinson.edu. 
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42, paragraphs 2 and 3 […]). Similarly, Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights states that “No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law”». Instead none of the 
considered judgments makes a comparable analysis with regard, 
for example, to the principle of retroactive application of the more 
lenient law, that – as I briefly mentioned above – is instead 
recalled in many rulings. 
Finally, from a search into the case-law of the Council of 
State47, by using as keywords “common constitutional traditions”, 
“constitutional tradition”, “constitutional traditions”, “national 
tradition”, and “national traditions”, only six rulings emerge (1 in 
2016, 1 in 2014, 2 in 2012, and 2 in 2010), containing generic 
references to Article 6, paragraph 3 TEU, mostly with regard to the 
right to education48, property and occupation sine titulo49, the right 
to respect of private and family life50, and the right to an effective 
judicial protection51, on top of an irrelevant document. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning order 754/2014 52 , that 
quotes in full sizeable paragraphs of the above-mentioned 
judgment No. 80/2011 of the Constitutional Court (as well as the 
subsequent judgment No. 210/2013, that reaffirmed the same 
principles), where the latter is credited for accomplishing a 
«precise reconstruction of the relations between the ECHR, 
European law and domestic law in their recent evolution». 
 
 
5. Conclusion: a possible categorisation 
The analysis of the Italian scholarship on common 
constitutional traditions has shown that the latter seems to 
address its efforts towards the construction of the CCT notion, 
rather than on trying to define what parts of the Italian 
constitution define the Italian constitutional identity. 
                                               
47 Also performed in November 2018. 
48 Interim opinion No. 960/2016. 
49 Judgment No. 4808/2012. 
50 Judgment No. 7200/2010. 
51 Opinion No. 5679/2010. 
52 Order N. 754/ 2014. 
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The case-law study has showed that the Italian high-level 
courts very rarely engage in an explicit definition of what 
comprises part of the national constitutional tradition (and, even 
less, the meaning of CCTs). With a few notable exceptions, such as 
the Taricco order, there are several fundamental rulings that 
simply do not mention the word ‘tradition’, and, conversely, those 
that do never engage in an in-depth analysis of the distinctive 
features of the Italian tradition, simply using the term as a 
rhetorical tool. 
When some cornerstone of the Italian tradition is involved, 
other notions tend to be referred to, such as the fundamental 
principles, unamendability, limits to the revision process and 
counter-limits. But these are indeed different notions, and also it 
happens rarely that single elements are discussed: for example, 
counter-limits are typically evoked much more than they are 
actually employed. In any case, even though many judgments 
mentioned do not include a reference to the Italian constitutional 
tradition, or explicitly state their goal to build it, it is beyond 
doubt that they instead contribute to define it and better 
understand it. 
Admittedly, the analysis of the case-law shows an increase, 
over recent years, in the use of the notion by top Italian courts. 
However, this does not yet seem to correspond to a quantum leap 
in the qualitative use of this formula. In other words, the more 
recent surge in registered references does not mean that a more 
thorough discussion of the notion has become part of the case-law, 
with only limited exceptions. 
In this vein, the rulings of the three highest Italian courts 
can arguably be categorised in three groups53. 
A first type of reference to common constitutional 
traditions is the one made with “defensive” purposes. The most 
                                               
53 I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Giacinto della 
Cananea for suggesting this classification to me. For a broad discussion on the 
“argumentative techniques” employed by the Italian constitutional court, see 
the systematic analysis conducted by the research group led by Mario Dogliani 
at the University of Turin: 
http://www.dircost.unito.it/SentNet1.01/def/sn_presentazione.shtml. See 
also some very insightful remarks in S. Cassese, Dentro la Corte: Diario di un 
giudice costituzionale (2015). 
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prominent example is the very famous Constitutional Court order 
No. 24 of 2017 (Taricco I)54. 
A second subset is represented by the rulings that instead 
use the notion of common constitutional traditions to foster a 
dialogue with the other courts; referral order 117 of 2019 on the 
principle of nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare is the most prominent 
ruling falling into this category55. 
Finally, by far the largest category is the one grouping 
rulings whereby the notion of constitutional tradition (or 
equivalent ones, for that matter) are used with a merely 
ornamental or rhetorical purpose. 
This approach is in line with the one I identified in the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in a similar analysis I 
performed, again within the framework of the ELI research 
project56. 
This conclusion does not mean that the (rising) importance 
of this notion for the highest Italian courts should be downplayed. 
After all, as Sabino Cassese brilliantly wrote in his behind-the-
scenes account of his nine years at the Constitutional Court: “Non 
c’è dubbio che il lavoro della Corte consista in un grande esercizio di 
logica e di retorica, la prima usata per analizzare e capire, la seconda per 
convincere” (“There is no doubt that the Court’s work consists of a 
great exercise in logic and rhetoric, the first used to analyse and 
understand, the second to convince”)57. 
However, as important as rhetoric can be in the Court’s job, 
it seems to be warranted to conclude, from the analysis carried 
out, that both the Italian legal scholarship and the Italian high-
                                               
54 Recourse to the “defensive” strategy reached one the most extreme levels in 
judgment No. 238 of 2014: this judgment does not refer to “constitutional 
traditions”; however, its recourse to the counter-limits makes it close to the 
Taricco I order from this perspective. 
55  A similar dialogical approach is adopted by the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court No. 115/2018 (the so called Taricco II judgment): however, 
neither this judgment refers to “constitutional traditions”, only making a 
cursory reference to the “countries of continental tradition”. 
56 I published the results of that inquiry in an article written with Michele 
Graziadei: R. de Caria, M. Graziadei, R. de Caria, M. Graziadei, The 
«Constitutional Traditions Common to the Member States» in the Case-law of the 
European Court of Justice: Judicial Dialogue at its Finest, cit. at 13. 
57 S. Cassese, Dentro la Corte: Diario di un giudice costituzionale, cit. at 53. 
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level courts still have a long way to go before exploiting the 
reference to (common) constitutional traditions in the Treaties to 
its fullest potential. It is this author’s hope that this article can 
humbly contribute to the great effort needed in this direction. 
